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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital 
inflows  to  identify  overvalued  equity.    This  is  a  relatively  exogenous 
overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying – buyers with excess 
liquidity – rather than what is being purchased.  We document substantial stock 
price impact associated with purchases by high-inflow mutual funds, and find the 
probability  of  an  SEO,  insider  sales,  and  the  probability  of  a  stock-based 
acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund 
buying pressure.  These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able 
to identify and exploit overvalued equity.  
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Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) have been widely studied in the literature, with little emerging 
consensus on their determinants and economic consequences. Proposed determinants of SEOs 
include  capital  investments,  refinancing,  liquidity  squeezes,  corporate  control,  stock  market 
microstructure and timing by managers with private information that their stock is overvalued 
(Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002)). In 
this  paper  we  propose  a  novel  approach  to  testing  the  market-timing  motive  for  SEOs,  and 
provide evidence of SEO timing.  
The main empirical challenge in tests of SEO timing is identifying overvalued firms. 
Prior  studies examining  market  timing  typically  use high  market-to-book ratios  or high past 
returns as identifiers of overvaluation.  However, these studies “continue to be hotly debated” 
(Baker,  Ruback,  and  Wurgler  (2007))  because,  as  described  in  detail  in  the  next  section, 
traditional  indicators  of  overvaluation  are  correlated  with  other  determinants  of  SEOs.    We 
respond  to  this  debate  in  the  literature  by  identifying  a  setting  in  which  overvaluation  is 
relatively exogenous to the firm.  In particular, we identify overvalued stocks as those subject to 
substantial buying pressure by mutual funds experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to 
widespread buying pressure by other mutual funds, and refer to these as stocks subject to Inflow-
driven Buying Pressure (IBP).  In this setting, the overvaluation is associated with who is buying 
– mutual funds with excess liquidity – rather than by what is being purchased. 
Mutual funds with large capital inflows are eager to invest the cash since stockpiling cash 
makes it difficult for them to outperform their benchmarks (Coval and Stafford (2007)) and since 
they may be precluded by their investment mandate from holding large cash balances.  This  
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excess liquidity is channeled into a narrow set of stocks since mutual funds follow specialized 
investment strategies (i.e., face restricted investment opportunity sets or IOS), and they likely 
face diminishing marginal investment prospects.  Consistent with restricted IOS and diminishing 
marginal investment prospects, we document that the average number of stocks held by mutual 
funds in the top capital flow decile is 107, which is a small fraction of the universe of stocks.  
Further, there is a monotonic positive relation between mutual fund flows and the proportion of 
existing positions expanded by these funds.  Funds with higher inflows expand more of their 
existing positions as opposed to initiating new positions; and in particular, 39% of the existing 
positions of funds in the top flow decile are expansions of previously held positions.  Funds with 
higher inflows have about the same proportion of newly initiated holdings as other funds.  This is 
in contrast to a positive relation between fund flows and initiations that would be expected if 
fund IOS and investment prospects were unrestricted. 
We expect inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure to result in upward stock price 
pressure if individual stocks have downward-sloping demand curves.  To identify overvaluation 
associated with mutual fund IBP rather than with fundamental information about the firms, we 
require IBP stocks to meet two ex ante conditions: (i) they are subject to buying pressure by 
mutual funds in the top flow decile, and (ii) they are not subject to buying pressure by mutual 
funds in other flow deciles.  Using these criteria we identify approximately 1.5% of all mutual 
fund trades as IBP.  We then document that IBP stocks have average prior-year returns of 49% 
and experience a cumulative decline in market-adjusted returns of 10% over the six quarters 
subsequent to the buying pressure quarter, consistent with overvaluation due to IBP.  In contrast,  
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stocks subject to widespread buying pressure by mutual funds other than those in the top decile 
of  capital  flows  (WBP  stocks)  have  average  prior-year  returns  of  32%  and  experience  a 
cumulative  decline  in  market-adjusted  returns  of  2.8%  over  the  subsequent  six  quarters, 
consistent with widespread buying being driven more by firm-specific information.
1  The large 
abnormal return reversion of IBP stocks after buying pressure is not consistent with alternative 
explanations that inflow-driven buying is informed, or that high-inflow fund managers are smart 
stock pickers. 
Identifying  equity  with  pronounced  and  sustained  overvaluation  (IBP  stocks)  is  a 
precondition to our main objective, testing the SEO timing theory.  If managers privately identify 
overvaluation and  time SEOs  to exploit  the  overvaluation,  we expect  IBP-affected  firms to 
exhibit a higher likelihood of SEOs relative to  all firms that are not overvalued.  We find 172 
SEOs associated with IBP stocks, collectively accounting for $23b of new equity.  These SEOs 
represent 5.2% by number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs in our sample.   We test the 
timing hypothesis by estimating a Logit model of SEO choice that controls for a number of 
determinants of SEOs, including prior returns and the  market-to-book  ratio. In addition, we 
construct a number of matched samples in which we first match  IBP firms to other firms on 
selected  firm  characteristics,  and  then  co mpare  SEO  probabilities  in  the  “treatment”  and 
“control” samples in the four quarters following IBP. In all tests, the probability of an SEO 
following  IBP  stock-quarters  is  significantly  higher,  ranging  from  30%  to  84%  higher 
probability.  This finding suggests that firm managers identify overvaluation and time SEOs.    
                                                 
1 In our formal tests, when comparing the behavior of IBP stocks to the relevant reference groups, we control for 
various firm characteristics such as prior returns.  
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To corroborate the evidence on SEO timing we test two other predictions.  First, if IBP 
firms are overvalued we expect an increase in insider sales. We therefore test for increased 
insider sales in the four quarters following IBP.  We estimate a multiple regression model of 
insider sales (e.g., Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Piotroski and Roulstone (2005), Jenter (2005)), and 
also  test  for  differences  in  mean  insider  sales  in  matched  samples.    In  all  tests,  we  find 
significantly higher insider sales in the four quarters following IBP, ranging from 5.3% to 9.3% 
higher sales ratios.  An increase in insider sales of IBP stocks is not consistent with alternative 
explanations that inflow-driven mutual fund purchases are informed.  However, it is consistent 
with  our  hypothesis  that  excess  fund  liquidity,  combined  with  funds’  restricted  IOS  and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects, is associated with overvalued purchases.   
Second, if IBP firms are overvalued we expect them to exhibit a higher likelihood of 
stock-based acquisitions in the four quarters following IBP.  Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Jensen 
(2005),  and  Rhodes-Kropf,  Robinson  and  Viswanathan  (2005)  suggest  that  overvaluation  is 
associated with stock-based acquisitions and increases the probability of deal initiation or of 
completion of previously initiated deals.  We find 268 acquisitions associated with IBP stocks, 
collectively accounting for $309b of transactions.  These acquisitions represent 3.9% by number, 
and 9% by dollar value, of all acquisitions in our sample.  We test the timing prediction by 
estimating a Logit model as well as by conducting tests of differences in acquisition frequency in 
matched samples.  In most tests of M&A probability in the four quarters following IBP, we find 
that the probability of an acquisition is significantly higher, ranging from 19% to 35% higher 
probability.    
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Our  findings  collectively  support  the  hypothesis  that  managers  exploit  “windows  of 
opportunity” (Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997)) presented by overpricing of their firms’ equity 
to time the market.  Our findings are also consistent with a broad class of models in which 
capital markets are imperfect but managers are able to identify price dislocations (see Baker, 
Ruback, and Wurgler (2007) for a review).  The equity market timing theory has implications for 
external financing choice, for the firm’s capital structure if the impact of timing is persistent, for 
corporate governance in terms of allowing managers discretion to exploit or ignore market price 
signals that differ from their private assessment of value, and for understanding determinants of 
insider trading.  
We  note  as  a  caveat  that  we  establish  an  association,  rather  than  a  causal  relation, 
between  buying  pressure  and  overvaluation.  A  causal  interpretation  is  consistent  with  our 
collective empirical evidence as described above, but without a rigorous proof of causality we 
cannot rule out potential alternative explanations for the association.   
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I briefly describes our setting and 
reviews  the  prior  literature  on  SEO  timing  and  price  pressure.    Section  II  describes  the 
identification of overvalued stocks as a result of IBP by mutual funds.  Section III describes tests 
of  SEO  timing,  insider  sale  timing,  and  M&A  timing.    Section  IV  discusses  a  number  of 
sensitivity tests.  Section V concludes with a summary, discussion of some implications of our 
findings, and suggestions for future research. 
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I. The Setting 
  A number of papers have examined whether managers time the market  when issuing 
equity.  The main empirical challenge is to identify mispriced stocks, and prior authors have used 
ex ante and ex post methods to infer mispricing (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007)). 
  Ex ante methods include using a measure of fundamental value scaled by market value, 
such  as  the  market-to-book  ratio,  or  using  prior  returns  to  identify  overvalued  stocks.    As 
emphasized in Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler  (2007), both measures are difficult to interpret. For 
example, measuring fundamental value is difficult since accounting book values are based on 
historical costs and subject to discretionary managerial accounting choices.  Further, the market-
to-book ratio is correlated with many firm characteristics that may drive financing policy, so 
high market-to-book ratios do not necessarily indicate overvaluation that can be exploited by 
market timers.  Prior returns as a measure of mispricing face similar difficulties in interpretation.  
Firms  with  high  prior  returns  may  have  discovered  valuable  growth  opportunities  and  thus 
harvesting these opportunities, rather than market timing, could drive the issuance decision. 
  Ex post methods rely on reversion in future abnormal returns to infer overvaluation.  For 
example, tests of long-horizon stock return performance following SEOs find underperformance, 
suggesting  that  issuance  occurred  when  the  stock  was  overpriced.    One  challenge  to  this 
interpretation is that risk changes may be associated with SEOs.  For example, Eckbo, Masulis, 
and Norli (2000) suggest that equity issuance lowers leverage and in turn systematic risk, leading 
to lower future returns.        
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  In this paper we use ex ante information to identify overvalued stocks, but our identifier 
is an event rather than a firm characteristic. In particular, the event is large uninformed buying 
pressure by mutual funds with large capital inflows.  We document that this event is associated 
with large abnormal returns and subsequent return reversion, and argue that this event is likely 
exogenous to the firm since it is associated with who is buying – buyers with excess liquidity – 
rather than with what is being bought. We discuss our identification method in detail in the next 
section.  
Prior empirical evidence of short-lived price pressure in equity markets is presented in 
Kraus and Stoll (1972), Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986), and Mitchell, Pulvino, and 
Stafford (2004), and evidence of slightly longer-lived price pressure of a few weeks is presented 
in Greenwood (2005).  However, relatively short-lived price pressure precludes testing the equity 
market timing theory.  Evidence of price pressure due to flow-driven mutual fund trading, with 
prices persistently reverting over a few quarters, is presented in Coval and Stafford (CS, 2007), 
but our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our objective is to test the equity market timing 
theory, while CS do not test the timing theory, (ii) our focus is on inflow-driven buying and we 
offer a story for the resulting price pressure, while CS focus on and offer a story for outflow-
driven firesales, and (iii) our mispricing identifier differs in that our mispricing candidates are 
stocks subject to buying pressure by funds in the top flow decile (first condition) but not subject 
to buying pressure by other funds (second condition).  The mispricing identifier in CS imposes 
our first, but not our second, condition.      
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  Consistent  with  our results,  Frazzini and  Lamont  (2008)  use mutual  fund flows  as  a 
measure of individual investor sentiment and find that high sentiment (or dumb money) predicts 
low future returns.  They also report that high sentiment is associated with increases in shares 
outstanding in the next three years.  Our paper differs in a number of ways: (i) our focus is on the 
timing of SEOs and we provide extensive tests of the SEO timing hypothesis, (ii) we show that 
insider sales are timed to exploit overvaluation, (iii) we show that stock-based acquisitions are 
timed to exploit overvaluation, and (iv) we show that managers respond to overvaluation in a 
more timely manner, within four quarters of being affected by IBP.  
Our paper is also related to Chen et al. (2007), who examine whether hedge funds exploit 
mutual fund trading pressure through front-running.  We examine whether a different group of 
market  participants,  firm  managers,  exploit  IBP  through  SEOs,  insider  sales,  and  M&A.  
Consistent with Chen et al. (2007), our results suggest that “sophisticated” market participants 
are able to  identify this particular  source of mispricing (price pressure due to  inflow-driven 
mutual fund purchases),
2 although our data allow us to provide more direct evidence since we are 
able to match SEOs, insider sales, and M&A to IBP-affected stocks.     
 
II. Mutual Fund Trading Pressure and Stock Price Impact 
  Mutual  funds  experiencing  large  capital  inflows  face  the  unique  challenge  of  excess 
liquidity: quickly finding productive opportunities for the new capital.  Stockpiling cash is likely 
against their charter, and is also likely to increase tracking error with respect to their all-equity 
                                                 
2 Anecdotal evidence suggests large investment banks also keep track of mutual fund flow-driven price pressure.    
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benchmarks.  Since funds follow specialized investment strategies we do not expect the excess 
cash  to  be  invested  widely  in  the  universe  of  stocks.    Rather,  funds’  restricted  IOS  and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects are likely to result in the excess cash being channeled 
into a narrow set of stocks and creating buying pressure in some stocks.  We expect the buying 
pressure by such funds to dislocate prices of the stocks they choose to buy (e.g., Coval and 
Stafford (2007)).     
For each stock held by mutual funds, we form a measure of trading pressure as follows.  
First, we define mutual fund flows as  
 
Flowj,s = {TAj,s – TAj,s-1(1+Rj,s-1)} / TAj,s-1             (1) 
 
where TA is total net assets of mutual fund j in month s, and R is the monthly return for fund j in 
month s.  We sum the monthly flows each quarter to obtain the quarterly flow, flowj,t, of mutual 
fund j in quarter t.  Mutual funds’ monthly total net assets and returns of mutual funds are 
obtained from CRSP, and quarterly mutual fund holdings are obtained from Thomson Financial.  
Mutual funds are required to report their holdings semi-annually, but  approximately 60% of 
funds report their holdings quarterly.  To calculate quarterly changes in holdings, we retain only 
contiguous fund-quarters in our sample.  In addition, we only consider open-ended U.S. equity 
funds and eliminate funds with investment objective codes indicating bonds and preferred stocks, 
international stocks, metals, and municipal bonds from our sample. 
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[TABLE I HERE] 
 
Table I shows quarterly flows, prior-year returns, total number of holdings, and percent 
of holdings that were expanded or initiated by mutual fund flow decile for 63,426 fund-quarters 
from 1990 to 2007.  The table shows a large spread in flows, ranging from 40.3% for the top 
decile to  –17% for the  bottom  decile.   Prior-year fund returns decrease monotonically  from 
16.6% for the top decile to 6.1% for the bottom decile.   This confirms evidence in the prior 
literature that (i) fund flows vary monotonically with past fund performance, and (ii) the flow-
performance relation is asymmetric in that inflows due to good past performance are much larger 
in magnitude than outflows due to poor past performance (Ippolito (1992), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)).    
Table I also shows a roughly inverted U-shaped relation between fund flows and number 
of  holdings,  with  funds  in  the  top  flow  decile  holding  on  average  107  stocks.    Funds  with 
extreme  flows  have  fewer  holdings  on  average  than  funds  in  the  middle  deciles  of  flows, 
suggesting that for some funds extreme performance may be associated with more concentrated 
positions.    The  table  also  shows  a  monotonic  positive  relation  (weakly  U-shaped  relation) 
between fund flow decile and the percent of holdings expanded (initiated).  For funds in the top 
flow decile,  39% of the existing holdings have been expanded from the prior quarter, while 19% 
of their existing holdings are new initiations (the remaining 42% of holdings have been either 
maintained or reduced from the prior quarter).  These results are consistent with mutual funds  
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having restricted IOS and diminishing marginal investment prospects for each additional inflow 
dollar.   
We calculate trading pressure for stock i in quarter t as  
 
Pressurei,t = 
{ 
j
, 0 (max( ∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t>90
th percentilet) – 
j
, 0 (max( −∆holdingj,i,t) | flowj,t<10
th percentilet) } 
/ Shares Outstandingi,t-1 ,                   (2) 
 
where i indexes the stock, j indexes the mutual fund, and t indexes the calendar quarter.  This 
measure  is  similar  to  those  used  in  Coval  and  Stafford  (2007)  and  Chen  et  al.  (2007).
3  
Intuitively, trading pressure is interpreted as buying pressure when funds with large inflows (top 
decile of flow in quarter t) are net buyers of the stock, and as selling pressure when funds with 
large outflows  (bottom decile of  flow in  quarter t)  are net  sellers of the stock.   In a sense, 
Pressure is a measure of excess demand from mutual funds with large capital flows. 
To distinguish  flow-motivated trading from  potentially  information-motivated trading, 
we calculate unforced pressure for stock i in quarter t as  
 
UPressurei,t =  {
j
∆holdingj,i,t | 10
th percentilet≤flowj,t≤90
th percentilet } / Shares Outstandingi,t-1   .        (3) 
                                                 
3 Results are robust to using average lagged quarterly trading volume over the prior two quarters as the denominator 
in calculating Pressure, as well as to excluding the max function, as reported in the Internet Appendix.  The Internet 
Appendix is located on the Journal of Finance website at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.  
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This variable captures net trading activity in a stock by mutual funds in the middle eight deciles 
of flows, or widespread net trading.  Information-driven purchases are identified as stocks in the 
top decile of UPressure.  The variable UPressure is similar to measures used in Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and Wermers (1999) to identify mutual fund demand imbalances. 
We sort stock-quarters into deciles of Pressure and UPressure, and identify IBP stocks as 
those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles (deciles four, five, and six) of 
UPressure.
4  In other words, IBP stocks are those that are subject to large buying pressure by 
mutual funds with extreme inflows, but that are not subject to widespread net trading pressure by 
other mutual funds.  IBP stocks are our overvaluation candidate s.   To examine whether the 
overvaluation of IBP stocks is driven by inflow-driven mutual fund buying pressure rather than 
by mutual fund buying pressure generally, we contrast the abnormal return pattern of IBP stocks 
with that of stocks in the top decile  of UPressure.  We refer to stocks in the top decile of 
UPressure as Widespread Buying Pressure (WBP) stocks. 
 
[TABLE II HERE] 
 
  Table II shows stock-level means of all variables for three samples: the full sample of 
stocks  used  in  our  tests,  IBP  stocks,  and  WBP  stocks.    We  obtain  accounting  data  from 
Compustat Fundamentals Quarterly.  We exclude all securities that do not have a share code of 
                                                 
4 Results are robust to intersecting the top Pressure decile with the middle two or middle four UPressure deciles, as 
reported in Section IV.  
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10 or 11 in CRSP.  Insider trading data are from the Thomson Financial Insider database.  The 
full sample includes 313,750 firm-quarters from 1990 through 2007.  The IBP sample consists of 
2,515 stock-quarters, and the WBP sample consists of 17,160 stock-quarters, from 1990 through 
2007.  All variable definitions are presented in the Appendix.  Table II shows that IBP and WBP 
stocks are similar in all characteristics with the exception of prior-year return, which is 49.3% for 
IBP stocks and 31.9% for WBP stocks, and Insider Sale, which is 0.483 for IBP stocks and 0.462 
for WBP stocks.  The differences in prior year return and Insider Sale are expected if IBP stocks 
are overvalued.  IBP and WBP stocks are also different in terms of Pressure and UPressure, but 
these differences occur by construction.  Finally, both IBP and WBP stocks are different from 
the full sample of stocks in several dimensions. 
 
[TABLE III HERE] 
 
Panel A of Table III shows quarterly mean abnormal returns from quarters t−4 to t+6 for 
stocks subject to mutual fund buying pressure in quarter t=0 (Pressure is calculated in quarter 
t=0).  Abnormal returns are industry-adjusted returns, using the Fama-French equal-weighted 48 
industry portfolios.  We calculate mean abnormal returns each quarter for the portfolio of IBP 
and WBP stocks, and use the time series of portfolio abnormal returns for statistical inference to 
control  for  cross-sectional  correlation  (e.g.,  Fama  and  MacBeth  (1973),  Coval  and  Stafford 
(2007)).  In Panel B of Table III abnormal returns are the alphas, or intercepts, from Fama and 
French (1993) factor model regressions.   IBP and WBP stocks are added to their respective  
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portfolios in the quarter following buying pressure and are held for three years or five years.  
Panel B reports monthly alphas in percentage points.           
Panel A of Table III shows that IBP stocks experience significantly positive abnormal 
returns in buying quarters, followed by  persistently negative abnormal  returns in subsequent 
quarters as buying pressure subsides.  IBP stocks have cumulative average abnormal returns of -
9.82%  (p-value<0.05)  from  quarters  t+1  to  t+6.    In  contrast,  WBP  stocks  experience  small 
negative abnormal returns after quarter t=0, with cumulative average abnormal returns from t+1 
to t+6 of -2.68% (p-value<0.10).  In Panel B, IBP stocks have statistically significant monthly 
Fama-French alphas of -0.36% (-0.31%) for three-year (five-year) holding periods, while WBP 
stocks have insignificant alphas. The abnormal return reversion for IBP stocks, but not for WBP 
stocks,  is  consistent  with  IBP  resulting  in  overvaluation  and  WBP  being  associated  with 
favorable firm-specific information.    
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 1 shows cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) for IBP and WBP stocks.  
We sum  average abnormal returns over consecutive quarters to  obtain the  CAAR shown in 
Figure 1.  The CAAR patterns in Figure 1 suggest that flow-driven mutual fund purchases result  
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in substantial overvaluation, or a shift in the demand curve for a stock.  In contrast, widespread 
buying by mutual funds (non-inflow-driven purchases) does not seem to result in overvaluation.
5  
 
III. Main Tests 
  Using the IBP stocks identified as overvalued in the previous section, we now turn to our 
main objective, testing the theory that firms exploit “windows of opportunity” to time SEOs 
(e.g., Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), Graham and Harvey (2001), Baker and Wurgler (2002)).  
Section A presents tests of SEO timing.  To corroborate the inference from Section A, we also 
test whether insider sales are timed (Section B) and whether stock-based corporate acquisitions 
are timed (Section C).     
 
A. Timing of SEOs  
  We test whether firms identify and exploit the overvaluation associated with mutual fund 
flow-driven buying pressure by issuing seasoned equity within four quarters of the stock being 
subject  to  IBP.  We do not  examine SEOs  contemporaneous  with  buying pressure to  avoid 
confounding inferences through any reverse causality (i.e., that mutual funds may be  buying 
because firms are issuing equity, rather than the reverse, which is our hypothesis).  The prior 
evidence  in  the  literature  suggests  that  a  four-quarter  managerial  response  window  allows 
sufficient time for firms to go to market once they decide to have an SEO.
6  Before the offering, 
firms have to register securities with the SEC and may also undertake marketing efforts to 
                                                 
5 Figure 1 depicts firm-level, not mutual fund-level, performance.   
6 Results are robust to using a two-quarter managerial response window as reported in the Internet Appendix.  
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discover or create demand.  Registration can be “traditional,” in which case firms register each 
offering immediately prior to the offering, or “shelf,” in which case firms pre-register future 
potential  offerings  up  to  two  years  in  advance  and  simply  take-down  these  pre-approved 
offerings  as  they  go  to  market.    Shelf  registrations  have  much  shorter  registration  times. 
Marketing  activities  can  be  full  or  accelerated,  depending  on  the  time  taken  for  demand 
discovery by sellers and due diligence by potential buyers, and take about two weeks for full 
marketing and as little as a day for accelerated marketing.  Overall, including both registration 
and marketing times, the average time between the SEC filing date and the offering date for 
SEOs is about 30 business days (e.g., Gao and Ritter (2010)). 
We test our hypothesis of SEO timing by estimating a Logit regression of the issuance 
decision in quarter t, including an indicator dummy for stock-quarters with IBP in any of the four 
quarters from t-4 through t-1, which allows a managerial response window of four quarters.  
Linear  regressions  of  SEO  choice  on  determinants  have  been  estimated  in,  for  example, 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2010).   
  Following the prior literature (e.g., Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000)), we obtain SEO 
data from the SDC database.  After retaining only common stock issuances that trade on the 
NYSE,  AMEX,  or  NASDAQ,  and  excluding  investment  trusts  (e.g.,  REIT’s),  American 
Depositary Receipts, utilities (SIC codes 4910-4939), and secondary offerings in which no new 
shares are issued, we are left with 3,307 SEOs between 1990 and 2007 that have all the required 
data for our tests.  We exclude utilities since the duration of the regulatory approval process 
limits the ability of utilities to time SEOs in response to temporary overpricing (Eckbo and  
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Masulis (1992)).   There are 172 SEOs of IBP stocks in the four quarters following IBP, and 
they collectively account for about $23b of stock issuance.  These SEOs represent 5.2% by 
number, and 6.6% by dollar value, of all SEOs in our sample. 
 
    
[TABLE IV HERE] 
 
Table IV, Panel A, shows the results of Logit regressions for the seasoned equity issuance 
choice.  The dependent variable is one if the firm has a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in quarter 
t, and zero otherwise.  The variable Buy Pressure, our main independent variable of interest, is a 
dummy that equals 1 if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 through 
t-4, and zero otherwise.  The other independent variables are determinants of the equity issuance 
decision suggested in the literature, and are described further below.  The regressions include 
industry, year, and quarter fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered on both firm and time 
(two-dimensional clustering) to control for cross-sectional and time-series correlation (Petersen 
(2009)).   
Four regression specifications are reported in Panel A of Table IV.  The first specification 
is  estimated  over  the  full  available  sample  of  313,750  stock-quarters.    The  other  three 
specifications are estimated over smaller samples in which each IBP stock-quarter is matched on 
industry and two other variables noted at the top of the respective column.  For example, in the 
second column, each IBP stock-quarter is matched with another stock in the same quarter and  
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industry and the same  asset growth (“first  matching variable”) and  ROA (“second matching 
variable”) quintile.  If there are multiple matches, we pick the match closest in the first matching 
variable.    This procedure does not yield a match for some IBP stock-quarters, but we do not 
relax the matching requirements because this would defeat the purpose of matching.  Sufficient 
sample sizes remain after matching, as noted in the tables.  We match on prior returns and book-
to-market  (BTM)  since  these  are  known  determinants  of  SEOs  and  have  also  been  used  as 
overvaluation  indicators  (e.g.,  Jenter  (2005)).  We  match  on  asset  growth  and  ROA  since 
profitability  and  growth  are  likely  important  determinants  of  the  external  financing  decision 
(e.g., Fama and French (2005)).  Once the matched sample is obtained, we estimate the Logit 
over the four quarters following IBP, controlling for other determinants of SEOs as in the full 
sample Logit.  We include these controls because, even in a paired sample, there continues to be 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics, including heterogeneity in the matching variables across 
pairs. 
The main result in Panel A of Table IV is that the dummy Buy Pressure is significantly 
positive, with one-tailed p-values less than 0.01 in three specifications and less than 0.05 in the 
fourth specification.  This suggests that, ceteris paribus, firms are significantly more likely to 
have SEOs in the four quarters following flow-driven buying pressure.  In terms of economic 
significance, in the full sample test the probability of an SEO in the four quarters following 
buying pressure is 58.6% higher for IBP stocks compared to other stocks.  The percent increase 
in  SEO  probability  is  49.6%  for  the  BTM-size  matched  sample,  29.7%  for  the  return-size 
matched sample, and 83.5% for the asset growth-ROA matched sample.  These results hold after  
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controlling for prior annual returns and the book-to-market ratio (BTM), which have been used 
as overvaluation indicators in the prior literature.  The interpretation is as follows.  Consider two 
firms with similar prior returns and BTM, only one of which is affected by IBP.  Under our 
hypothesis the IBP firm is overvalued, while, as described earlier, high prior returns and low 
BTM may be interpreted as due to fundamental news.  The timing hypothesis suggests that Buy 
Pressure should load  significantly positively  after controlling for  fundamental  news in  prior 
returns and BTM, and the hypothesis is supported in Table IV. 
Also in Panel A of Table IV, the probability of issuing equity is significantly increasing 
in the one-year return in all samples, and significantly decreasing in the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) in three samples, consistent with firms issuing equity after they have experienced high 
returns (e.g., Asquith and Mullins (1986), Loughran and Ritter (1995)) or when their market 
values are high relative to book values (e.g., Jenter (2005), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2010)).    Leverage  loads  significantly  positively  in  all  samples,  consistent  with  “financially 
constrained”  firms  being  more  “equity-dependent”  (e.g.,  Baker,  Stein,  and  Wurgler  (2003)).  
ROA is significantly negative in all three matched samples, consistent with more profitable firms 
being  less  dependent  on  external  financing.    Asset  growth  is  significantly  positive  in  three 
samples, consistent with a need for external capital to finance growth.  The change in stock 
return  volatility  over  the  prior  year  loads  significantly  negatively  in  all  matched  sample 
regressions, which is consistent, for example, with an increase in volatility delaying an SEO due 
to  the increased basis risk  in  going to  market.   The loadings  of other  variables vary across 
samples in significance or sign.     
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To relax the linearity assumption implicit in the regressions of Panel A, Panel B of Table 
IV reports SEO frequencies and a test of difference in SEO probabilities for IBP versus matching 
firms for each of the three matched samples used in Panel A.  In all three matched samples, the 
probability of an SEO in the four quarters following IBP is significantly higher with one-tailed p-
values less than 0.01, consistent with the evidence in Panel A.  For instance, in the return-size 
matched test, the relative frequency of an SEO is 1.4% in the matched sample, compared to 1.9% 
in  the  IBP  sample, which represents  a 38% increase in  SEO frequency.  Overall, Table  IV 
provides support for our main hypothesis that firms time equity issuances to exploit exogenous 
overvaluation. 
 
B. Timing Insider Sales  
  If managers identify and exploit price pressure by timing SEOs, we expect them to time 
their  personal  sales  similarly.    This  is  a  powerful  test  of  our  hypothesis  that  mutual  fund 
purchases of stocks we identify as IBP are overvalued and result from funds’ restricted IOS and 
diminishing marginal investment prospects, as opposed to the alternative information hypothesis 
that IBP stock purchases are due to favorable fundamental information about the firm.  We 
expect  insiders  to  sell  more  shares  in  the  four  quarters  following  IBP  if  the  IBP  stock  is 
overvalued  (our  hypothesis),  but  not  if  their  firm  faces  favorable  future  prospects  (the 
information hypothesis).  The hypothesis is tested by estimating regressions of insider sales in 
quarter t, including an indicator variable for buy pressure as defined earlier.   
  The power of our test to detect timing by managers is potentially limited by the fact that  
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firms frequently restrict insider sales to certain short windows, for example, within three to 12 
days after quarterly earnings announcements (Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000)), or require 
managers to maintain a certain minimum level of holdings.  We expect this is unlikely to be an 
issue because: (i) we examine insider sales over the four quarters following flow-driven buying 
pressure, not within a narrow window of a few days, and (ii) this limitation biases against our 
ability to reject a null hypothesis of no change in insider sales. 
 
[TABLE V HERE] 
 
  Panel A of Table V shows results of panel regressions with Insider Sale, the ratio of 
shares sold to the sum of shares sold and purchased, as the dependent variable.
7  All trades are 
open market trades.  The regressions include time and industry fixed effects, and standard errors 
are  clustered  on  both  firm  and  time  (two -dimensional  clustering).    Four  regressions  are 
estimated, one for the full sample of 211,227 stock-quarters with all available data, and one each 
for three matched samples.  We match on prior one-year return and size, and on BTM and size, 
since returns and BTM have been used as overvaluation identifiers in the prior literature, as 
noted earlier.  For the third matched sample we match on size and lagged insider sales to control 
for individual managers’ persistent liquidity and diversification needs.  The main result in Panel 
A of Table V is that the dummy Buy Pressure is significantly positive in all samples with one-
tailed p-values less than 0.01.  The coefficient on Buy Pressure is of 0.027 in the full-sample 
                                                 
7 Our dependent variable, the sales ratio, is similar to that in Rozeff and Zaman (1998) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2005), who use the purchase ratio, calculated as shares purchased divided by the sum of shares purchased and sold.  
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regression.  Since the mean of Insider Sale in Table II is 0.4003, this suggests that insider sales 
increase by 0.027/0.4003 = 6.9% in the four quarters following IBP, which is an economically 
significant magnitude. 
  Also  in  Panel  A  of  Table  V,  Insider  Sale  is  increasing  in  firm  size  in  all  samples, 
consistent with Seyhun (1986), Rozeff and Zaman (1988), and Core et al. (2006).  The variable 
Insider Sale is significantly positively related to the past one-year return, suggesting that insiders 
sell relatively more than they purchase when the stock price is high relative to the past.  Further, 
Insider Sale is generally decreasing with the BTM decile in all samples, consistent with Rozeff 
and  Zaman  (1998),  Piotroski  and  Roulstone  (2005),  and  Jenter  (2005).    The  BTM  decile 
dummies are labeled BTM1, BTM2, and so on, with BTM1 being low and BTM10 being high 
book-to-market.  We omit BTM10 from the regression and so it is the reference or base decile.  
This result suggests that insiders at high growth firms sell relatively more than they purchase 
compared to insiders at value firms, consistent with exit or diversification needs of insiders at 
high growth firms.    
As in Core et al. (2006), we control for insiders’ normal propensity to trade with lagged 
Insider Sale.  We find that Insider Salet-4, which effectively controls for unidentified omitted 
variables in our regression, is significantly positive with p-values less than 0.01 in all samples.  
We  also  control  for  the  level  of  insider  holdings,  Insider  Holding,  and  find  that  it  loads 
significantly positively with p-values less than 0.01 in all samples, suggesting that insiders sell 
more when they have higher exposure to firm-specific risk through higher holdings. 
In Panel B of Table V we relax the linearity assumption implicit in the regressions of  
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Panel A.  Panel B reports the mean insider sale ratio for IBP versus matching stocks for each of 
the three matched samples, as well as p-values for a test of difference in means.  For each 
matched  sample,  insider  sales  are  significantly  higher  for  IBP  stocks  in  the  four  quarters 
following IBP, with p-values less than 0.01.  Overall, the results in Table V align with those 
reported in Table IV, and suggest that insiders are able to identify overvaluation and hence to 
time both firm-level equity issuances and insider sales.    
 
C. Timing Mergers and Acquisitions 
  Jensen (2005) suggests that overvalued equity is used as currency to finance stock-based 
acquisitions.  The models in Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan 
(2004) also  predict the  same, while the empirical  evidence in  Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson,  and 
Viswanathan (2005) suggests that acquirer overvaluation is higher in completed deals than in 
failed deals.  Hence, if IBP stocks are overvalued, we expect a higher likelihood of stock-based 
acquisitions in the four quarters following buying pressure because overvaluation can affect both 
the likelihood of deal initiation as well as the likelihood of completion of previously initiated 
deals.  However, the power of our test is potentially limited if: (i) acquisitions require time and 
overvaluation  diminishes  with  time,  (ii)  higher  overvaluation  than  that  resulting  from  flow-
driven mutual fund purchases is needed to trigger acquisitions, and (iii) mergers occur primarily 
in  waves,  in  response  to  industry-wide  rather  than  firm-specific  overvaluation.    Our 
overvaluation indicator is firm-specific (recall that Table III and Figure 2 show industry-adjusted 
negative abnormal returns for IBP firms after the buying pressure quarter).  
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  We test for M&A timing using Logit regressions in which the dependent variable is one 
if  the  firm  completed  an  acquisition  in  quarter  t,  and  zero  otherwise  (Harford  (1999)  also 
estimates linear regressions of the M&A decision).  M&A data comes from the SDC database.  
We  find  268  acquisitions  associated  with  IBP  stocks,  collectively  accounting  for  $309b  of 
transactions.    These  acquisitions  represent  3.9%  by  number,  and  9%  by  dollar  value,  of  all 
acquisitions in our sample.  The main independent variable of interest in our Logit regressions is 
the dummy Buy Pressure, defined as previously.  We control for prior one-year return and BTM 
because these have previously been used as overvaluation indicators.  We control for cash, ROA, 
and dividend yield because profitable firms that retain cash are more likely to acquire (e.g., 
Jensen (1986)).  We also control for size and asset growth over the prior year (e.g., Harford 
(1999)). 
  Table VI, Panel A, reports results of four Logit regressions, one estimated over the full 
sample of all available firms, and the other three estimated over matched samples.  The dummy 
Buy Pressure is significantly positive with a p-value less than 0.01 in the full-sample Logit, and 
the coefficient indicates an increase in acquisition probability of 20%.  It is also significantly 
positive with a p-value less than 0.05 in the sample matched on asset growth and ROA, with a 
coefficient indicating an increase in acquisition probability of 24.3%.  The dummy Buy Pressure 
is insignificant in the other two matched samples (return-size and BTM-size).  Panel A of Table 
VI also shows that return, size, and asset growth are significantly positive in all samples as 
predicted  (e.g.,  Harford  (1999)),  and  BTM  is  significantly  negative  as  predicted.    ROA  is 
significantly positive in the matched sample regressions, consistent with more profitable firms  
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being more likely to engage in an acquisition. 
 
[TABLE VI HERE] 
  
  In Panel B of Table VI we relax the linearity assumption implicit in Panel A and report 
acquisition frequencies, as well as a test of difference in M&A probabilities for  IBP versus 
matching firms, for each of the three matched samples.  IBP firms are significantly more likely to 
acquire than matched firms, with p-values less than 0.01 for the asset growth-ROA and return-
size matched samples, and less than 0.05 for the BTM-size matched sample.  The increase in 
acquisition  probability  ranges  from  18.7%  (BTM-size  sample)  to  34%  (asset  growth-ROA 
sample).  Overall, the evidence in Table VI supports the earlier evidence that firm managers 
identify and exploit overvalued equity. 
   
 
IV. Additional Analysis 
  In this section we conduct a number of sensitivity tests.  We summarize the results below 
and report all tables as well as additional tests in the Internet Appendix.  
 
 (i)  Our  return-matched tests  are  designed to  address  the possibility of a nonlinear  relation 
between prior-year stock returns on the one hand, and SEOs, insider sales, and M&A on the 
other.  We further address the possibility of a nonlinear relation using dummies for the first nine 
return deciles, labeled ret10 to ret 90.  For the top return decile, we use percentile dummies  
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labeled ret91 to ret99.  Hence, we simultaneously control for ret10, …, ret90, ret91, ….., ret99 in 
the main regressions. We find that the results are robust.  In particular, the probability of an SEO 
is 50.5% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 7.2% higher (p-value<0.01), and the probability 
of a stock-based acquisition is 26.8% higher (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP.    
 
(ii)  Our hypotheses contrast IBP stocks with all other stocks.  The rest of the stocks include 
WBP stocks, and we do not separately control for a WBP indicator in our main tests.  WBP 
stocks  are  subject  to  widespread  mutual  fund  buying  pressure,  which  potentially  reflects 
favorable information about  these firms and their  investment  opportunities. Thus, it is  quite 
likely that WBP is positively correlated with future SEOs and acquisitions.  Such correlation 
may arise due to the relatively favorable investment opportunities of WBP firms (Table III and 
Figure 1 suggest that WBP stocks are not overvalued since there is no return reversion after 
WBP). As an extension of our benchmark specification, we include an indicator variable for 
WBP.  We  use  this  indicator  to  absorb  some  of  the  unexplained  variation  in  the  dependent 
variable across the sample of non-IBP stocks.   The results are robust to including an indicator 
for WBP stocks.  In particular, the probability of an SEO is 58.6% higher (p-value<0.01), insider 
sales are 7.5% higher (p-value<0.01), and the probability of a stock-based acquisition is 26.9% 
higher (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP.    
 
 (iii) We use both newly initiated holdings and expansions of existing holdings by high inflow 
funds  to  identify  IBP  stocks.  An  argument  for  price  pressure  associated  with  investment  
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constraints  applies  more  naturally  to  funds’  existing  holdings  as  opposed  to  newly  initiated 
positions. We therefore modify Pressure to sum increases in holdings by mutual funds in the top 
flow decile only if these increases are expansions of previously held positions, and not new 
initiations.  The results are robust.  Specifically, IBP stocks have cumulative market-adjusted 
returns of -7.84% (p-value<0.01) over the six quarters following buying pressure.  In addition, 
the  probability  of  an  SEO  is  50%  higher  (p-value<0.01),  insider  sales  are  5.4%  higher  (p-
value<0.01),  and  the  probability  of  an  acquisition  is  22%  higher  (p-value<0.01)  in  the  four 
quarters following buying pressure. 
 
(iv)  We identify IBP firms as those in the top decile of Pressure but in the middle three deciles 
of UPressure.  Our objective in intersecting with the middle deciles of UPressure is to isolate 
stocks  that  are  not  being  widely  traded  by  all  other  mutual  funds.    Although  symmetry 
considerations may dictate using the middle quintile of UPressure, we expand our sample of IBP 
stocks by including three middle deciles. As a robustness check, we replicate our key regressions 
while intersecting  the top  decile of  Pressure  with  either the middle two  or the middle  four 
UPressure deciles. In both cases we find slightly stronger results.  For the case of the middle two 
deciles of UPressure, we identify 1,523 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative 
abnormal returns of -12.84% (p-value<0.05) over the six quarters following buying pressure.  
Furthermore, the probability of an SEO is 63% higher (p-value<0.01), insider sales are 6.9% 
higher (p-value<0.01), and the probability of an acquisition is 30% higher (p-value<0.05) in the 
four quarters following buying pressure. For the case of the middle four deciles of UPressure,  
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we identify 3,384 IBP stock-quarters from 1990 to 2007, with cumulative abnormal returns of 
-7.9% (p-value<0.01) over the six quarters following IBP.  Furthermore, the probability of an 
SEO  is  59%  higher  (p-value<0.01),  insider  sales  are  7.5%  higher  (p-value<0.01),  and  the 
probability of an acquisition is 28% higher (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP. 
  
 (v)  We repeat the insider sale tests under an alternative definition of insiders as the top five 
executives: CEO, Chairman, President, CFO and COO.  The results are robust, with insider sales 
increasing by 6.6% (p-value<0.01) in the four quarters following IBP.   
       
V. Conclusion 
          The prior literature examines the price impact of trades by mutual funds with large capital 
inflows  and  outflows.    We  find  that  stocks  subject  to  buying  pressure  by  mutual  funds 
experiencing large capital inflows, but not subject to widespread buying pressure by other mutual 
funds, experience a substantial upward price impact.  Since we use widespread mutual fund 
buying pressure as an indicator of informed trading, this result suggests that stock prices change 
in response to uninformed shifts in demand.  
Inflow-driven  mutual  fund  buying  pressure  is  a  relatively  exogenous  overvaluation 
identifier for SEO timing studies because it is associated with who is buying – buyers with 
excess liquidity – rather than with what is being purchased.  The price effects of mutual fund 
buying  pressure  are  sufficiently  long-lived  to  allow  managers  who  are  able  to  identify  the 
overvaluation to time SEOs, insider sales, and stock-based acquisitions. We find that in the four  
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quarters following the occurrence of flow-driven buying pressure, the probability of an SEO is 
59% higher, insider sales are 7% higher, and the probability of completion of a stock-based 
acquisition is 20% higher.  These results suggest that firm managers are able to identify and 
exploit overvaluation. 
Our evidence of a long-lived price impact of uninformed demand shifts, while consistent 
with empirical evidence in Coval and Stafford (2007) and the arguments of Shleifer (1986), is 
intriguing.  One possible conclusion is that arbitrage was unsuccessful at flattening the demand 
curve.    Reasons  for  limits  to  arbitrage  include  the  unavailability  of  close  substitutes, 
specialization among arbitrageurs  combined with a limited number of arbitrageurs, lingering 
differences in investor opinion about the true value of the stock, and short sales constraints. 
Alternatively,  as  Coval  and  Stafford  (2007)  point  out,  market  participants  may  have  been 
unaware of the return pattern induced by mutual fund flows because the relevant data was not 
available at the time.  As we show, despite the data limitations, some firm managers are able to 
identify overvaluation in the equity of their own firm and react to it by issuing additional shares 
or selling shares from their personal account. The persistence of the price impact presents an 
opportunity for future research. 
Our findings have a number of additional implications for future research.  First, in an 
international context, smaller markets with fewer close substitutes for individual stocks may 
experience a greater price impact from uninformed shifts in demand, which suggests that the 
patterns of predictability that we identify may be even stronger in such markets. Second, the 
possibility of persistent stock price dislocation due to uninformed demand shifts has implications  
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for managerial performance evaluation and the optimal sensitivity of managerial compensation 
to short-run stock returns.  Third, from a corporate governance perspective, our findings suggest 
that managers are sometimes better informed than the market and are able to identify market 
misvaluations, which has implications for the level of discretion they are allowed in responding 
to  price  movements  through  a  variety  of  corporate  decisions.    Other  research  opportunities 
include examining the bond price impact of mutual fund trading pressure and the likelihood of 
subsequent debt issuances, and examining the effect of mutual fund trading pressure on the use 
of cash versus stock in corporate acquisitions. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Asset growth is the change in the log of total assets from the same quarter in the previous year.   
BTM is book value of shareholders’ equity over market value of equity. 
BTM1 to BTM10 are deciles of BTM, from BTM1 (low BTM) to BTM10 (high BTM).   
Cash is cash and short-term investments over total assets.   
Dividend yield is the dividend per share divided by the stock price.   
Insider Holding is the number of shares held by insiders scaled by total shares outstanding.   
Insider Sale is the ratio of shares sold by all insiders to the sum of shares sold and purchased by 
all insiders in a firm-quarter.   
Leverage is long-term debt plus long-term debt in current liabilities, over total assets.   
Pressure is defined in equation (2) in Section II in the text. 
1-year Return is the stock return over the prior year.  
ROA is operating income before depreciation over total assets.     
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets.   
UPressure is defined in equation (3) in Section II in the text. 
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the quarter.   
ΔVolatility is the change in volatility from the same quarter in the previous year.   
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Table I:  
Mutual Fund Flow Predictability and Prior Performance 
Mutual funds are sorted quarterly into deciles of capital flows.  The sample consists of 63,426 fund-quarters from 1990 to 2007.  Flow is 
calculated as as {TAj,s – TAj,s-1(1+Rj,s-1)} / TAj,s-1, where TA is total net assets of mutual fund j in month s, and R is the quarterly return for fund j 
in month s.  Monthly flows are summed to obtain the quarterly flow, flowj,t, of mutual fund j in quarter t. Prior Fund Return is the fund return 
in the last year.  Avg # Holdings is the average number of stocks in a fund-quarter.  % Holdings Expanded is the percent of stocks held in 
quarter t that were held in t-1 and in which the fund increased its holdings.  % Holdings Initiated is the percent of stocks held in quarter t that 
were not held in t-1.   
 
Flow Decile  Flow   Prior Fund Return  Avg # Holdings  % Holdings Expanded  % Holdings Initiated 
Inflow  40.3%  16.6%  107  39%  19% 
9  14.1%  14.6%  122  34%  17% 
8  7.0%  13.2%  149  31%  16% 
7  3.3%  12.1%  145  26%  16% 
6  1.0%  11.0%  144  23%  16% 
5  -0.7%  9.8%  126  20%  16% 
4  -2.3%  9.1%  117  19%  17% 
3  -4.1%  7.8%  106  18%  18% 
2  -6.8%  6.3%  99  18%  19% 
Outflow  -17.0%  6.1%  103  16%  20% 
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Table II:  
Stock-level Means, and Tests of Differences in Means 
Table II reports means for the full sample, for the stocks subject to inflow-driven buying pressure (IBP sample), and for stocks subject to 
widespread buying pressure by all mutual funds other than funds in the top decile of capital flows (WBP sample).  The full (IBP) [WBP] 
sample consists of 313,750 (2,515) [17,160] stock-quarters from 1990 through 2007.  IBP stocks are those in the top decile of Pressure, but in 
the middle three deciles of UPressure, in quarter t=0.  WBP stocks are those in the top decile of UPressure in quarter t=0.  Pressure is a stock-
level measure of flow-motivated trading by all mutual funds.  UPressure is a measure of widespread trading by mutual funds that is not 
motivated by capital flows and is intended to capture information-motivated trading. All variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
The last three columns report tests of differences in means between the three samples.  Differences in means are calculated each quarter for 
each pair of samples, and the time series of differences are used for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional correlation.  ***, **, and 
* represent one-tailed statistical significance at less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
  Full Sample  IBP Sample  WBP Sample       
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1) - (2)  (1) - (3)  (2) - (3) 
ROA  0.017  0.030  0.032 
*  **   
1 year Return  0.183  0.493  0.319 
***  ***  *** 
BTM  0.669  0.489  0.534 
**  *   
Size  5.342  6.259  6.231 
***  ***   
Leverage  0.206  0.202  0.208 
     
Dividend yield  0.004  0.002  0.003 
     
Cash  0.167  0.198  0.177 
*     
Volatility  0.030  0.029  0.028 
     
ΔVolatility  0.000  -0.002  -0.002 
     
Asset growth  0.083  0.192  0.164 
***  ***   
Insider Sale  0.400  0.483  0.462 
***  ***  ** 
Insider Holding  0.025  0.016  0.015 
***  ***   
Pressure (%)  0.032  1.055  0.157 
***  *** 
*** 
Upressure (%)  0.375  0.685  9.676 
* 
*** 
*** 
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Table III:  
Quarterly Abnormal Stock Returns due to Mutual Fund Buying Pressure 
Panel A shows mean quarterly abnormal returns from quarters t-4 to t+6 for stocks subject to mutual fund buying 
pressure  in  quarter  t=0.    Abnormal  stock  returns  are  industry-adjusted  returns  using  the  Fama-French  equal-
weighted 48 industry portfolios.  In Panel B, abnormal returns are the alphas (intercept) from calendar-time Fama 
and French (1993) three-factor regressions.  The dependent variable in Panel B is the monthly excess return, over 
the risk-free rate, on a portfolio of IBP Stocks, and WBP Stocks, held for three years (upper panel) or five years 
(lower panel).  Mkt-Rf, SMB and HML are the Fama-French factors.  The alpha is in percentage points. IBP and 
WBP are described in the notes to Table II.  The IBP (WBP) sample consists of 2,515 (17,160) stock-quarters from 
1990 through 2007. All variable definitions are presented in the Appendix.  In Panel A, mean abnormal returns are 
calculated each quarter for the portfolio of IBP stocks and WBP stocks, and the time series of portfolio abnormal 
returns are used for statistical inference to control for cross-sectional correlation.  ***, **, and * represent one-tailed 
statistical significance at less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
 
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Returns 
Quarter  IBP Stocks  WBP Stocks 
t-4  1.99% 
**  2.33% 
*** 
t-3  3.53% 
***  2.24% 
*** 
t-2  2.29% 
**  2.64% 
*** 
t-1  2.82% 
**  3.22% 
*** 
t=0  5.12% 
***  2.57% 
*** 
t+1  -3.10% 
***                  -0.23% 
t+2               -1.11%  -0.80% 
* 
t+3  -2.19% 
***                  -0.52% 
t+4               -1.55% 
**                  -0.29% 
t+5               -1.41% 
*                  -0.61% 
t+6               -0.45%                  -0.23% 
     
[t+1, t+6]  -9.82% 
***  -2.68% 
* 
 
 
Panel B: Fama-French Alphas (α) 
3-year  IBP  WBP 
  α           -0.36 
**                -0.08 
  Mkt-Rf              1.3 
***  1.21 
*** 
  SMB            0.68 
***  0.61 
*** 
  HML             0.07  0.33 
*** 
     
  Adj. R
2  86%  88%  
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5-year     
  α          -0.31 
**                -0.04 
  Mkt-Rf  1.28 
***  1.19 
*** 
  SMB  0.66 
***  0.61 
*** 
  HML           0.12 
*  0.34 
*** 
     
  Adj. R
2  87%  88%  
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Table IV:  
Timing Seasoned Equity Offerings 
Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the equity issuance choice on the independent variables shown.  The dependent variable is 
one if the firm has a seasoned equity offering (SEO) in quarter t, and zero otherwise.  Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals one if the stock was 
subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4, and zero otherwise.  IBP is described in the notes to Table II.  All variable definitions 
are presented in the Appendix. The second column shows results for the full sample.  The last three columns show results for matched samples 
in which IBP stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and 
second matching variables are indicated at the top of the column.  Once the matched sample is obtained, a Logit regression is estimated with 
the same dependent and independent variables as for the full sample regression.  Standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-
dimensional clustering), and the samples span 1990 through 2007.  ***, **, and * represent one-tailed statistical significance at less than the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  Panel B reports SEO frequencies in all three matched samples.  In Panel B, SEO equals one for stock-
quarters with an SEO, and zero otherwise, while IBP equals one if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and zero 
otherwise.  The p-value in Panel B is from a test of difference in SEO relative frequencies when IBP equals one versus zero. 
 
Panel A: SEO Logit Regression Coefficients 
  Full Sample    Matched Samples 
Variable      BTM-Size  Return-Size  AssetGrowth-ROA 
Intercept  -6.077 
*** 
  -4.163 
***  -4.086 
***  -4.633 
*** 
Buy Pressure  0.461 
***    0.403 
***  0.260 
**  0.607 
*** 
ROAt-4          -0.105    -2.413 
**  -3.406 
***  -2.754 
*** 
Casht-4  0.689 
***    0.512 
*         0.404               0.471 
1 year Return  0.482 
***    0.459 
***  0.494 
***  0.364 
*** 
Sizet-4  0.177 
***    -0.115 
***  -0.077 
*              -0.059 
BTMt-4  -0.532 
***          -0.111  -0.592 
***  -0.458 
*** 
Leveraget-4  0.564 
***      1.348 
***  1.162 
***  1.141 
*** 
Dividend yieldt-4  -15.178 
***        -28.904         -0.204              -1.265 
Volatilityt-4  14.659 
***           0.335          1.542               3.318 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4          -0.611        -15.033 
***  -12.524 
**             -12.550 
** 
Asset growth  0.421 
***    0.225  0.271 
*  0.397 
*** 
Time f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2  9.4%    8.3%  9.2%  7.7%  
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N  313750    16620  16642  16650 
 
 
Panel B: SEO Frequencies 
      Matched Samples 
SEO  IBP    BTM-Size  Return-Size  AssetGrowth-ROA 
0  0    8202  8202  8230 
0  1    8146  8157  8163 
1  0    108  119  95 
1  1    164  164  162 
           
p-value      <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
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Table V:  
Timing Insider Sales 
Panel A reports coefficients from regressions of insider sales (Insider Sale) in quarter t on the independent variables shown.  Buy Pressure is a 
dummy that equals one if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4, and zero otherwise.  IBP is described in the 
notes to Table II.  All variable definitions are presented in the Appendix.  The second column shows results for the full sample.  The last three 
columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second 
matching variable}, where the first and second matching variables are indicated at the top of the column.  Once the matched sample is obtained, 
a regression is estimated with the same dependent and independent variables as for the full sample regression.  Standard errors are clustered on 
both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), and the samples span 1990 through 2007.  ***, **, and * represent one-tailed statistical 
significance at less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  Panel B reports mean insider sales in all three matched samples.  In Panel B, 
IBP equals one if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and zero otherwise.  The p-value in Panel B is from a test 
of difference in mean insider sales when IBP equals one versus zero. 
 
Panel A: Insider Sale Regression Coefficients 
  Full Sample    Matched Samples 
Variable      BTM-Size  Return-Size  Size-InsiderSalet-1 
Intercept  0.247 
*** 
  0.214 
***  0.218 
***  0.184 
*** 
Buy pressure  0.027 
***    0.021 
***  0.025 
***  0.025 
*** 
Sizet-4  0.008 
***    0.009 
***  0.008 
***  0.011 
*** 
Insider Salet-4  0.170 
***    0.181 
***  0.192 
***  0.176 
*** 
1 year Return  0.062 
***    0.063 
***  0.061 
***  0.060 
*** 
Volatilityt-4  -0.902 
***          -0.071         -0.133                   -0.009 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4  -1.674 
***    -2.172 
***  -2.164 
***  -2.173 
*** 
BTM1  0.094 
***    0.090 
***  0.093 
***  0.101 
*** 
BTM2  0.099 
***    0.094 
***  0.091 
***  0.108 
*** 
BTM3  0.088 
***    0.067 
***  0.056 
***  0.084 
*** 
BTM4  0.078 
***    0.070 
***  0.079 
***  0.086 
*** 
BTM5  0.069 
***    0.069 
***  0.056 
***  0.075 
*** 
BTM6  0.056 
***    0.043 
**  0.052 
***  0.064 
*** 
BTM7  0.043 
***           0.031  0.036 
**  0.048 
*** 
BTM8  0.026 
***           0.024           0.021                    0.032 
* 
BTM9  0.025 
***           0.014           0.013                    0.031 
*  
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Insider Holding  0.373 
***    0.716 
***  0.747 
***  0.909 
*** 
Time f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2  8.82%    7.31%  8.00%  7.81% 
N  211227    13526  13590  13596 
 
 
Panel B: Mean Insider Sales 
    Matched Samples 
IBP    BTM-Size  Return-Size  Size-InsiderSalet-1 
0    0.438  0.427  0.433 
1    0.467  0.466  0.467 
         
p-value    <0.01  <0.01  <0.01 
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Table VI:  
Timing Acquisitions 
Panel A reports coefficients from logit regressions of the acquisition choice on the independent variables shown.  The dependent variable is one 
if the firm engages in a stock-based acquisition in quarter t, and zero otherwise.  Buy Pressure is a dummy that equals one if the stock was 
subject to IBP in any of the four quarters from t-1 to t-4.  IBP is described in the notes to Table II.  All variable definitions are presented in the 
Appendix.  The second column shows results for the full sample.  The last three columns show results for matched samples in which IBP stock-
quarters are first matched on {quarter, industry, first matching variable, second matching variable}, where the first and second matching 
variables are indicated at the top of the column.  Once the matched sample is obtained, a Logit regression is estimated with the same dependent 
and independent variables as for the full sample regression.  Standard errors are clustered on both firm and time (two-dimensional clustering), 
and the samples span 1990 through 2007.  ***, **, and * represent one-tailed statistical significance at less than the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  Panel B reports acquisition frequencies in all three matched samples.  In Panel B, M&A equals one for stock-quarters with an 
acquisition, and zero otherwise, while IBP equals one if the stock was subject to IBP in any of the quarters from t-1 to t-4, and zero otherwise.  
The p-value in Panel B is from a test of difference in relative acquisition frequencies when IBP equals one versus zero. 
 
Panel A: M&A Logit Regression Coefficients 
  Full Sample    Matched Samples 
Variable      BTM-Size  Return-Size  AssetGrowth-ROA 
Intercept  -4.891 
*** 
  -5.120 
***  -5.188 
***  -5.279 
*** 
Buy pressure  0.183 
***            0.114         0.098              0.218 
** 
1 year Return  0.255 
***    0.251 
***  0.228 
***  0.250 
*** 
Sizet-4  0.175 
***    0.138 
***  0.153 
***  0.153 
*** 
BTMt-4  -0.749 
***    -0.585 
***  -0.557 
***  -0.638 
*** 
ROAt-4           0.265    2.714 
***  1.756 
*  2.755 
*** 
Casht-4    0.374 
***            0.177           0.156              -0.023 
Dividend yieldt-4  -6.202 
**           12.246  11.796 
*               8.134 
Volatilityt-4  2.992 
*    19.161 
***  18.819 
***  18.846 
*** 
ΔVolatilityt,t-4          -0.276    12.138 
***           5.321  7.259 
** 
Asset growth  0.438 
***    0.569 
***  0.644 
***   0.680 
*** 
Time f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry f.e.  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj R
2  7.2%    4.7%  4.7%  6.1% 
N  313750    16620  16642  16650 
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Panel B: M&A Frequencies 
      Matched Samples 
M&A  IBP    BTM-Size  Return-Size  AssetGrowth-ROA 
0  0    8085  8108  8125 
0  1    8043  8056  8057 
1  0    225  213  200 
1  1    267  265  268 
           
p-value      0.02  <0.01  <0.01 
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Figure 1. Stock-level abnormal returns due to mutual fund buying pressure.  The figure shows cumulative 
average abnormal returns of stocks subject to buying pressure by mutual funds. Abnormal returns are industry-
adjusted returns, using the Fama-French equal-weighted 48 industry portfolios.  We sum average quarterly abnormal 
returns to obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns. IBP and WBP are described in the notes to Table II.  The 
IBP (WBP) sample consists of 2,515 (17,160) stock-quarters from 1990 through 2007.   